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Abstract
A leaning-against-the-wind intervention that has only a temporary effect on the exchange
rate and that is not too aggressive can be shown analytically to yield positive expected
profits to a central bank even when the exchange-rate process is non-stationary. These
profits arise if there are some transitory shocks to the exchange rate. Funhermore, very
aggressive intervention will yield positive expected profits eventually when there is a
tendency for exchange rates to return to a long-run equilibrium level.
February 1993
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Central Banks' Expected Profits from Intervention
Central banks often justify interventions in foreign exchange markets on the
grounds that they are countering "disorderly markets". A sudden drop in the price of
foreign exchange may be slowed or stopped by a central-bank purchase of the foreign
exchange. If the decrease is only transitory, the bank can later sell the foreign exchange
at a profit when the price has gone back up. This line of reasoning led Milton Friedman
(1953) to argue that stabilizing intervention should be profitable for a central bank. A
policy of buying when low and selling when high moderates the extent to which
exchange rates vary and at the same time is profitable for the central bank. Conversely,
if the central bank loses money from its interventions, Friedman would view that as an
indication of destabilizing intervention in the sense of keeping the exchange rate away
from its equilibrium level.
In a provocative paper, Dean Taylor (1982) examines whether central banks did
or did not make profitable interventions. Using data from nine countries from the
beginning of general floating in the early 1970's until the end of 1979, he found that most
central banks lost money from their interventions and for some the losses were
significant. Taylor, following up on Friedman's ideas, argues that when a permanent
economic shock causes the equilibrium exchange rate to shift, a "leaning-against-the-
wind" policy will lose money. For example, if the equilibrium price of foreign exchange
is falling a central-bank purchase of foreign exchange will keep the price from falling as
fast as it would without intervention, but the central bank in effect loses on the
transaction when the price later falls below the purchase price. The bank may have
succeeded in moderating the rate of change in the exchange rate but, in the sense that the
price has been kept away from its equilibrium, the loss sustained by the central bank.
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signals destabilizing intervention. In light of the losses by central banks, Taylor suggests
that private speculators could make money and serve a stabilizing role by betting against
the central bank.
The estimated profits or losses sustained by central banks turn out to be sensitive
to the time period chosen for the calculations. To avoid the problems of measuring
inventory gains or losses, other researchers have restricted attention to periods in which
net intervention is small. Victor Argy (1982), for example, restricts his calculations to
periods in which purchases of foreign exchange are approximately equal to sales. A
Bank of England study (1983) provides evidence that the intervention by the Bank of
England tended to yield profits, most convincingly in periods of nearly zero net
intervention. Lawrence Jacobsen (1983) calculates the profitability of US intervention in
DM. While the intervention appears unprofitable over periods in which cumulative net
intervention is substantial, the results are more positive if one examines the entire period
and subperiods in which net intervention was near zero.
Charles Corrado and Dean Taylor (1986) are critical of the studies that restrict the
sample to periods over which cumulative net intervention is zero and argue that this
introduces a positive bias to expected profits. By a similar line of reasoning, one could
argue that studies of almost any realization of profits from intervention are subject to the
charge of bias relative to expected profits. Taylor's calculations of profits, for example,
were over a period in the 1970's in which the dollar realized substantial depreciation.
The central banks by buying dollars had accumulated reserves with a market value at the
end of the sample period well below the purchase price. For most patterns that might
have reasonably been anticipated ex ante, this panicular end-of-sample realization surely
fell below the expected price of the dollar. c
· ..
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What is neat about Corrado and Taylor's contribution is that they calculate
expected profits based on assumptions about (a) the movements in exchange rates that
would have occurred in the absence of intervention, (b) the intervention rule utilized, and
(c) the effects of intervention. Specifically, they assume that the exchange rate would
have followed a random walk in the absence of intervention and prove that a leaning-
against-the-wind intervention policy can expect negative profits.
We follow up this analysis by considering two other possibilities. The first
begins with the observation that there can be both permanent and transitory changes in
the exchange rate. The bank would want to offset the transitory changes and ignore the
permanent ones, but if the bank cannot immediately tell one type of change from the
other, should it intervene or not? To provide an analytic answer, we can introduce a
first-order moving-average process for the exchange rate in the absence of intervention
The moving-average parameter represents the extent to which exchange-rate changes are
transitory. Although this is, like a random walk, a nonstationary process, we show that
there is scope for profitable intervention.
The second possibility considered is based on the observation that exchange rates
appear to move in long waves, with periodic returns to what may be considered long-run
equilibrium levels. Consequently, we shall also explore the expected profitability of a
leaning-against-the wind intervention policy when the exchange rate follows a fmt-order





To set the stage for our own analysis, we initially reproduce several elements of
the specification used by Corrado and Taylor (1986). Assume fIrst that the intervention
rule is the following leaning-against-the-wind policy:
(1)
where
St =the observed spot exchange rate, and
It = net purchases of foreign exchange by the central bank.
The parameter A indicates the extent of the intervention in response to a change in the
spot exchange rate. Assume A> O. A positive value of It denotes a purchase of foreign
exchange and a negative value a sale. So the central bank buys foreign currency when
the price falls and sells when the price rises. A substantial body of empirical work finds
that the major explanatory variable for official intervention is the change in the exchange
rate. Some of this is cited by Corrado and Taylor. A recent survey by Geen
Almekinders and Sylvester Eijffinger (1991) suggests similar results. While evidence of
asymmetry in responses under different situations emerge in some studies, interventions
still frequently appear to lean against the wind.
Assume next that intervention has a temporary effect on the exchange rate:
(2)
where
Ft =the "free" exchange rate in the absence of intervention.
• it..
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According to equation (2), intervention changes the spot exchange rate from what it
would have been, but there is no permanent effect. The parameter ex ~ 0 denotes the
strength of the effect of intervention. When the central bank buys foreign exchange the
price will be temporarily higher (assuming a > 0) than it would have been without the
intervention, and when the bank sells foreign exchange the price will be temporarily
lower. Almekinders and Eijffinger (1991) also survey several empirical studies assessing
the effects of intervention. There appears to be virtually no evidence that sterilized
intervention can make a permanent change in the exchange rate through a portfolio
balance effect, but there is some evidence of shon term effects in daily data that die out
in the course of a month.
The net profit 1t from central bank transactions in the foreign exchange market
from time 1 to N is defined as the difference between the net accumulated reserves
valued at the end-of-period rate and their initial cost:
(3)
N N
1t = FN L. It - L. StIt
t=l t=1
When the sum of the interventions is zero, profits are positive if the purchases (with It
positive) occur at a lower average price than the sales (when It is negative). When the
sum of the accumulations is non-zero, then one must also take into account the valuation
gains or losses by valuing the stocks at the end-of-period free rate relative to the purchase
or sale prices at which the interventions took place. Equation (3) taken from Corrado
and Taylor accomplishes this valuation.
· .... -
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To express profits in tenns of the free exchange rate, which will be assumed to
be given exogenously, substitute for St from equation (2) into the profit equation (3) and
N
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With successive substitutions of equations (1) and (2), It can be written as:
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Equation (5) can then be substituted into (4) to get profits that will result from the
intervention policy as a function of changes in the free exchange rate.
Corrado and Taylor assume that the free exchange rate follows a random walk:
(6)
where the ut are independently and identically distributed random variables with a mean
of zero and a variance of c? They then prove that the expected profit E(1t) is always
negative as long as the central bank's intervention can affect the exchange rate (a. > 0). If
· ....
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a = 0 and if the exchange rate follows a random walk, the central bank's expected profits
are zero.
We will replace the random walk. assumption of equation (6) with two
alternatives, both of which contain the random walk as a special case.
TI. Intervention with a Moving Average Process
Consider the following moving average process:
(7)
where ut is an unobserved exogenous shock, with the properties previously assumed.
The parameter e indicates the degree to which the shocks are transitory. If e =0, the
level of F is permanently changed by u. This would be the case of a random walk..
If e= I, the effect of a shock disappears fully after one period and the shocks are entirely
transitory. For any e in between there is a mixture of permanent and transitory shocks.
e ut is transitory and (1 - e) ut is permanent.
In a discussion of empirical regularities in the behavior of exchange rates, Mussa
(1979, p. 11) notes that typically for monthly data a "fIrst-order moving average process
gives a slightly better explanation of the data than the model that assumes that ut is
serially uncorrelated." According to Mussa, estimates of e are generally between 0 and
.2. Using extremely high-frequency data, Ito and Roley (1986) and Goodhart and
Figliuoli (1991) report that large exchange rate jumps are partially reversed within a day.
These studies suggest one should not dismiss the existence of both permanent and
transitory shocks in exchange rate movements An analytically tractible way to handle
this is to assume a first-order moving average process.
...
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With 6 < 1, the process specified by equation (7) is non-stationary over time. If
only the net effects of the shocks are considered, then the process can be viewed as a
random walk, as if there were a series of cumulative shocks of (1 - 6) ut. We examine
whether or not leaning-against-the-wind intervention, as assumed in equation (1), can be
expected to generate positive profits if the free rate follows this moving-average process.
The calculation of expected profits involves fairly messy algebra, which has been
relegated to an appendix. As shown in the appendix, the expected profits are:
(8)
- Nep2a1
Note that for 6 = 0, which is the case of a random walk, E(1t) = 2 < o.
a(l - <j) )
This is the result obtained by Corrado and Taylor. More generally, if <j) ~ a then E(1t)
. < 0 for any N. If the extent of the intervention is too great relative to the moving-
average parameter, the central bank can expect losses from the intervention.





(8 - 4»(1 - 84»
Assuming 8 is positive, a central bank can always expect a positive profit by choosing
the coefficient of the leaning against the wind 0.) in equation (1) so that 4> < 8 for any N
aA. .
> N*. From the definition of 4>, this holds if 1 + aA. < 8 or If
a
A. < a(1 - 8f(9)
· '--
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The central bank. has more flexibility in its choice of a profitable I.. when the effect of the
intervention (a.) is smaller and when e is larger, i.e., when the transitory shocks are
larger relative to the permanent shocks.
To help get an intuitive grasp on this result. consider Figure 1. Based on
information through observations available up to and including time t-l, there is an
expected value of the free exchange rate in period t. This is depicted by the point
denoted by Et-1Ft in the figure. Suppose in the absence of intervention, the exchange
rate would fall to the point Ft. Given the assumed moving average process, the expected
value at time t for Ft+ 1 is given by the following adaptive-expectations formula:
The upward sloping line in Figure 1 represents equation (2) and shows the
assumed temporary tradeoff between the amount of intervention and the observed
exchange rate. As long as 5t is below EtFt+l' the central bank. is buying foreign
exchange at a price below its expected value next period and this is essentially how it can
make an expected profit. The scope for profitable intervention is increased by a larger e
which would move EtFt+1 farther from Ft, and by a lower a. which would mean a flatter
line representing equation (2). This is consistent with the analytic results discussed
above in conjunction with inequality (9).
Our analysis has proceeded as if all the parameters are known and the draws of
the free exchange rate always come from the process assumed in equation (7). If this
were generally known and the central bank did not intervene to the extent that 5t =
EtFt+I' then private speculators would presumably have an incentive to buy the currency
when 5t < EtFt+1, and sell the currency when 5t > EtFt+l. If speculative trades drive 5t
· ..
If ,;'x rt l1 r of
I"+.".ve '" f, '~I'
· ...
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into equality with Elt+l' then the best forecast of the next value of the free exchange
rate is the current exchange rate. This son of informed speculation leads to the familiar
theoretical claim that the actual exchange rate will follow a random walk.
What we have in mind is addressing a different question. Suppose central banks
mechanically follow a frequently assumed leaning-against-the-wind intervention rule and
amid the noise in exchange rate movements there is a mixture of permanent and
transitory shocks, represented by a moving-average process which is not clearly
perceived. Could the mechanical intervention rule yield positive expected profits and
hence satisfy Friedman's criterion for stabilizing intervention? The answer is yes if the
strength of the intervention satisfies inequality (9).
Funherrnore, as shown in the appendix:
(10)
A strict inequality holds if <I> > O. Since <I> > 0 when the central bank leans against the
wind (A > 0 ) and the intervention has some effect on the exchange rate (ex > 0 ), the
central bank can moderate the shon-run variability of the exchange rate and have positive
expected profits for 0 < <I> < 8.
III. Intervention with an Autoregressive Process
Plots of exchange rates over time between major currencies indicate clearly that
there have been long swings in the data. How this can be best modelled formally is still
an open question, but some form of mean reversion is frequently acknowledged. For
example, Huizinga (1987, p. 208) writes: "...the long-run movements of real exchange
· ..... -
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rates differ from those implied by a random walk by having a notable mean reverting
compontent." More recently, Glen (1992) using variance ratio tests suggested by Lo and
MacKinlay (1988) rejects random walk behavior in favor of mean reversion with annual
data at lags greater than two years. Over shoner periods of time, however, these tests
indicate that exchange rates have what may be called mean aversion, a tendency to move
away from some long-run equilibrium significantly faster than a random walk would
predict. This is reponed by Glen with monthly data and by Liu and He (1991) with
weekly data. A similar interpretation can be taken from the analysis by Engle and
Hamilton (1990), who argue that long swings in exchange rates can be modeled by an
underlying two state Markov chain. These and other empirical studies provide scope for
a variety of hypotheses one might choose to analyze the expected profitability of leaning-
against-the-wind intervention by central banks.
In what follows, we have worked out the results if the mean reverting tendencies
are modeled by a first-order autoregressive process in the absence of intervention.
Assume therefore that the free exchange rate follows the following autoregressive
process:
(11) Ft = oFt_1 + ut
where 0 ~ 8 ~ 1.
If 0 = 1, this would be a random walk. With 0 < 0 < 1, there is a gradual return to
a long-run value, which has been normalized to 0 in this formulation. As in the previous
section, we investigate whether a mechanical leaning-against-the-wind policy can be
profitable and if so, under what conditions. The algebra has again been relegated to the








if 0 = 1
Note that when 0 = 1, the Corrado-Taylor result emerges again and leaning against the
wind cannot achieve positive expected profits.




> N(1 - 8)
The right side of (13) asymptotically approaches zero as N gets larger. Therefore, no
matter how aggressively the central bank intervenes, Le., no matter how close q, is to one,
its intervention can eventually achieve positive expected profits if the exchange rate
follows a stable autoregressive process in the absence of intervention.
In the appendix it is also shown that
(14) = (1 + </»(1 + 0)(1 - <1>8)
~- _. Recall that </) = aJJ(l + aA) where A. is the strength of the intervention and ex is
the effect of the intervention. By choosing a large A. that puts q, close to one, the central
bank can eliminate almost all variability in the exchange rate, if it has sufficient reserves,
and still expect long-run profitability from its intervention assuming 8 < 1, i.e., assuming




We have shown that under a mechanical rule for intervention, positive expected
profits are possible if the free exchange rate in the absence of intervention would have
followed a first-order moving-average process or a first-order autoregressive process.
These assumed processes are not meant to represent precisely how exchange rates will
move, and interventions are often sporadic rather than following a mechanical rule. The
analyses do, however, provide an antidote to the impression left by Corrado and Taylor
that intervention can necessarily be expected to lose money in the long run, with the
implied interpretation that central banks should have known better than to have
intervened. The analysis with the moving average process suggests that central-bank
profits from responding to what are at least in part transitory changes in the exchange
rate can outweigh losses from the permanent changes even if the exchange-rate process is
non-stationary. Funhermore, the analysis with an autoregressive process suggests that
even very aggressive leaning against the wind by the central bank will yield positive
expected profits eventually when there is a tendency for exchange rates to return to a
long-run equilibrium level.
We should note that other analytical issues arise when central banks intervene to
try to defend exchange rate target-zone systems, such as the Bretton Woods System or
the European Exchange Rate Mechanism. In those cases, the issue becomes whether or
for how long the central banks can weather speculative attacks on pegged exchange rates
when there are divergent domestic policies. Our analysis applies more to regimes of
managed floating in which the central bank is reacting to exogenous events in an attempt




Almekinders, Geen J. and Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger, "Empirical Evidence on Foreign
Exchange Market Intervention: Where Do We Stand?" Weltwirstschaftliches
Archiv, 127, 1991, 645-677.
Argy, Victor, "Exchange Rate Management in Theory and Practice," Princeton Studies in
International Finance, No. 50, 1982.
Bank of England, "Intervention, Stabilization and Profits," Bank of England Quarterly
Review, September 1983.
Corrado, Charles J. and Dean Taylor, "The Cost of a Central Bank Leaning Against a
Random Walk," Journal of International Money and Finance, 5, 1986,303 - 314.
Engle, Cha: les and James D. Hamilton, "Long Swings in the Dollar: Are They in the
Data and Do Markets Know It?" American Economic Review, 80,September 1990,
689-713.
Friedman, Milton, "The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates," Essays in Positive
Economics, University of Chicago Press, 1953, 157 - 203.
Glen, Jack D., "Real exchange rates in the shon, medium, and long run," Journal of
InternationaL Economics, 33 (August 1992), 147-166.
Goodhan, Charles, and L. Figliuoli, "Every Minute Counts in Financial Markets,"
Journal of InternationaL Money and Finance, 10, 1991,23-52.
Huizinga, John, "An Empirical Investigation of the Long-Run Behavior of Real
Exchange Rates," in K. Brunner and A.H. Meltzer (oos), EmpiricaL Studies of
Velocity, Real Exchange Rates, Unemployment and Productivity, North Holland,
1987.
Ito, Takatoshi and V. Vance Roley, "News from the U.S. and Japan: Which Moves the
Yen/Dollar Exchange Rate?" NBER Working Paper No. 1853, March 1986.
• it..
15
Jacobson, Laurence R., "Calculations of Profitability for U.S. Dollar-Deutschemark
Intervention," Board of Governors of the FOOenil Reserve System, Staff Study No.
131, September 1983.
Liu, Christina Y. and Jia He, "A Variance-Ratio Test of Random Walks in Foreign
Exchange Rates, The Journal ofFinance, 1991, 773-785.
Lo, Andrew W. and Craig MacKinlay, "Stock Market Prices Do Not Follw Random
Walks: Evidence from a Simple Specification Test,: Review of Financial Studies,
1,1988,41-66.
Mussa, Michael, "Empirical Regularities in the Behavior of Exchange Rates and Theories
of the Foreign Exchange Market," in K. Brunner and A.H. Meltzer (OOs), Policies
for Employment, Prices and Exchange Rates, North Holland, 1979.
Taylor, Dean, "Official Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market, or, Bet against the
Central Bank," Journal of Political Economy, 90, April 1982, 356 - 368.
· ....
16
Central Banks' Expected Profits from Intervention, Appendix
Derivations of Expected Profits
Taking the expected value of the profit function equation (4) in the text gives the
following expression, assuming N > 1.
The intervention rule and intervention effect imply as shown in equation (5):
(A.2)
A Movin~-Ayera~e Process
Assume that the free exchange rate follows the moving average process:
















Forthe second term in E(1t) :
(A.6)
=
(1 + 82 - 28<1» <1>2a2
a2( 1 - <1>2)
From (A.1), (A.5) and (A.6),
(A.7) =
Nct>a2
= a( 1 _<1>2) (8(l - <1>2) - (l + 82 - 28<1»<I>J
~<I>(8 - <1»(1 - 8ct»a2 8<1>a2
= a( 1 - <1>2) a
This is reproduced as equation (8) in the text.
We next consider how the intervention affects the variance of changes in the
exchange rate. To do this, use equations (1) and (2) in the text to relate S to F and take





(A.8) ~St = (1 - $) L <1>k~t_k
k=O
It follows from (A.8) and (A.4) that:
(A.9) Var(~St) = (1 - <1»2 [ i <1>2kE(~t_k2) + i <1>2k+lE(~t_k~t_k_l)]
k=O k=O
(1- p)f 2
= (1 _$) [(l + 8 ) - 2<1>8]
This is reproduced as (10) in the text.
An Autoregressive Process
Now assume that the free exchange rate follows a first-order autoregressive
process:
(A. 10)
where °~ 8 ~ 1 and Eu =0, Eu2 =a'l. We fITst need to obtain the covariance sttucture
for~t·
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For 0 < 8 < 1, Ft =L &ut_j and ~t =Ft - F t _l =(0 - l)Ft_l + ut . So
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= E [ {Ut + (0 - 1)~ li'Ut_j _1}{ut -k+ (0 - 1)~ oiUt_k_j_1} ]
= {{(0 - l)ok-\_k + (0 - 1)~ oiut-i-1} {th + (0 - 1)~ oi'\-k-i-l} ]
= {{(0 - I)Ok-\_k + (0 - 1)~ oiut _i_.}{'\-k + (0 - 1)~ oi-""-i_.} ]
00
= 8k-1(8 _ 1)c? + (8 - 1)2 ~ 82j-kc?
j=k
= [1 + 8i~ -8l)] (8 - 1)8k- 1c?










Before deriving expected profits, we first obtain the variance of the observed
change in the exchange rate.
= 2(l-q»2c:?{i l~:O -i ~+kG~~)&-k-l}
k=O j>k
Note that I ~+koi-k-l = (I q>2k+lLI (q>Oik-1]
j>k k=O· k+l
= ~(~~~l~ (~O~]
= $-.....,....o -q>O)O _q>2)
(A.12) :. var(.!\St) =
=~{ (1-8)!}
(1 +q»(1 +8) 1- 1-<1>8
This is reproduced as (14) in the text.
= (1 + q»(1 + 8)(1 - <1>8)
Since It = - A.(~St)' E(lt2) = 1..2 var(~St)
Also since <1> = I ~oA' 1..2 = a.2(i~2)' and it follows that
This will be used for the second tenn in equation (A.1) for expected profits.
To obtain the first tenn for exp~~ted profits in equation (A.!), we need to
consider various values of the parameter o. If 0 = 0, then ~ Ft = ~ ut from (A. 10) and
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from (A.2)
= E{( :;~ F~,6UjJ(~~k6Ut.kJ} from (A.lO) and 5 =0
(N - I)<P~
= a.
For 0=1, Wt=ut and:
(A.I5)





1 '" <l>k..!....:..! &+k-t-1er from (A. 11)o.£..J 1+0
k=O
j>(1 - 0)oi-t-1er
0.(1 + 0)(1 - <1>0)
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<per ( _0- ON )
0.(1 + 0)(1 - <1>0) N - 1 - 1 - 0
_<per (1 - ON )
a(1 + 0)(1 - <1>0) N - 1 - 0
Therefore, using (A.I3) through (A.I6) in (A.I)
_per {N (..!...:..t) ~}
0.(1 + 0)(1 - <1>0) 1 + <I> - 1 - 0
(A 17) E(1t) =
This is reproduced as (12) in the text.
ifo=l
